The epistemic paradoxes
Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||The four primary epistemic paradoxes are the lottery, preface, knowability, and surprise examination paradoxes. The lottery paradox begins by imagining a fair lottery with a thousand tickets in it. Each ticket is so unlikely to win that we are justified in believing that it will lose.|
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Added to index2009-01-28
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