David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 173 (1):89 - 105 (2010)
The best defense of the doctrine of the Incarnation implies that traditional Christianity has a special stake in the knowability paradox, a stake not shared by other theistic perspectives or by non-traditional accounts of the Incarnation. Perhaps, this stake is not even shared by antirealism, the view most obviously threatened by the paradox. I argue for these points, concluding that these results put traditional Christianity at a disadvantage compared to other viewpoints, and I close with some comments about the extent of the burden incurred
|Keywords||Knowability Incarnation Traditional Christianity Anti-realism Omniscience Essential properties|
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References found in this work BETA
Alvin Plantinga (1992). The Nature of Necessity. Clarendon Press.
Harry G. Frankfurt (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39.
Neil Tennant (1997). The Taming of the True. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2006). The Knowability Paradox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Michael Dummett (2001). Victor's Error. Analysis 61 (1):1–2.
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