Graduate studies at Western
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (4):422-428 (1999)
|Abstract||The knowability paradox threatens metaphysical or semantical antirealism, the view that truth is epistemic, by revealing an awful consequence of the claim [i] that all truths are knowable. Various attempts have been made to find a way out of the paradox.|
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