The value of knowledge and truth
| Abstract | The questions concerning the value of knowledge and truth range from complete skepticism about such value to more discriminating concerns about the precise nature of the value in question and the comparative judgment that one of the two is more valuable than the other. | |||||||||
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Daniel Whiting (forthcoming). Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief. In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief.
Elke Brendel (2009). Truth and Weak Knowledge in Goldman's Veritistic Social Epistemology. Grazer Philosophische Studien 79 (1):3-17.
Alexander S. Harper (2010). Fallibilism, Contextualism and Second-Order Skepticism. Philosophical Investigations 33 (4):339-359.
Ernest Sosa (1993). Epistemology, Realism, and Truth: The First Philosophical Perspectives Lecture. Philosophical Perspectives 7 (1):1-16.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2012). ``Truth-Tracking and the Value of Knowledge&Quot. In Kelly Becker (ed.), New Essays on Sensitivity and Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sherrilyn Roush (2007). Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
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