David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 21 (2):175-184 (1984)
attacks new defenders of foundationalism. Some simply took on the critics, 2 but others attempted to argue that even if the critics were right, only one form of foundationalism was suspect, not foundationalism itself. For, according to these defenders, foundationalism is not to be identified with the view of Classical Foundationalism (CE) that all of our knowledge rests on incorrigible beliefs. Rather foundationalism is the view that all of our knowledge rests on beliefs that are self-warranting in some sense. Thus, even if CF is false, it does not follow that foundationalism is false.
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Ted Poston (2012). Basic Reasons and First Philosophy: A Coherentist View of Reasons. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
James A. Martin (1988). Is Foundationalism Indefinable? Metaphilosophy 19 (2):128–142.
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