Wright on truth and superassertibility
|Abstract||Crispin Wright argues persuasively that truth cannot be understood in terms of warranted assertibility, on the basis of some very simple facts about negation. The argument, he claims, undermines not only simply assertibility theories of truth, but more idealized ones according to which truth is to be understood in terms of what is assertible in the long run, or assertible within some ideal scientific theory.|
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