Zagzebski on Justification
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):191-196 (2000)
| Abstract | The heart of the epistemological interest of Zagzebski’s book is found in the tasks of clarifying the natures of justification and knowledge in terms of the intellectual virtues. It is in virtue of undertaking this task that Zagzebski presents a version of virtue epistemology. Though the book has several interesting features apart from this task, I want to argue that in its fundamental tasks, the book is a failure. In particular, I will argue that Zagzebski’s virtue account of justification is irreparably inadequate. | |||||||||
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Trent Dougherty (2011). Knowledge Happens: Why Zagzebski has Not Solved the Meno Problem. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):73-88.
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Jason S. Baehr (2006). Character in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):479--514.
L. Nathan Oaklander (1995). Time and Foreknowledge: A Critique of Zagzebski. Religious Studies 31 (1):101 - 103.
Michael Tooley (2000). Freedom and Foreknowledge. Faith and Philosophy 17 (2):212-224.
Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (2004). Divine Motivation Theory. Cambridge Univeristy Press.
Michael R. DePaul & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.) (2003). Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Kvanvig (2000). Review: Zagzebski on Justification. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):191 - 196.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2000). ``Zagzebski on Justification&Quot. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60:191--196.
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