Skepticism and Education: In search of another filial tie of philosophy to education

Educational Philosophy and Theory 44 (5):535-545 (2011)
Abstract
As a way of participating in the discussion on the disciplinary nature of philosophy of education, this article attempts to find another distinctive way of relating philosophy to education for the studies in philosophy of education. Recasting philosophical skepticism, which has been dismissed by Dewey and Rorty in their critiques of modern epistemology, it explores whether Cavell's romantic interpretation of it can allow us to conceive of skepticism as an exemplary practice of education, especially internal to the learner. This opens up the possibility of viewing the disciplinary nature of philosophy of education as congenial to other humanities like literature or religious studies, rather than to social sciences as usually considered
Keywords Cavell  nature of philosophy of education  philosophical skepticism  practice of education  confessional discourse
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References found in this work BETA
Wilfred Carr (2006). Philosophy, Methodology and Action Research. Journal of Philosophy of Education 40 (4):421–435.

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