'What is (mental) disease?': an open letter to Christopher Boorse

Journal of Medical Ethics 27 (2):80-85 (2001)
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Abstract

This “open letter” to Christopher Boorse is a response to his influential naturalist analysis of disease from the perspective of linguistic-analytic value theory. The key linguistic-analytic point against Boorse is that, although defining disease value free, he continue to use the term with clear evaluative connotations. A descriptivist analysis of disease would allow value-free definition consistently with value-laden use: but descriptivism fails when applied to mental disorder because it depends on shared values whereas the values relevant to mental disorders are highly diverse. A part-function analysis, similarly, although initially persuasive for physical disorders, fails with the psychotic mental disorders because these, characteristically, involve disturbances of the rationality of the person as a whole. The difficulties encountered in applying naturalism to mental disorders point, linguistic-analytically, to the possibility that there is, after all, an evaluative element of meaning, deeply hidden but still logically operative, in the concept of disease

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Citations of this work

The concept of health: beyond normativism and naturalism.Richard P. Hamilton - 2010 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 16 (2):323-329.
Why mental disorders are just mental dysfunctions (and nothing more): Some Darwinian arguments.Andreas De Block - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 39 (3):338-346.
Medico-ethical versus biological evaluationism, and the concept of disease.Jon A. Lindstrøm - 2012 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 15 (2):165-173.

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References found in this work

Health as a theoretical concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
On the distinction between disease and illness.Christopher Boorse - 1975 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 5 (1):49-68.
A plea for excuses.John Austin - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:1--30.
Wright on functions.Christopher Boorse - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (1):70-86.
What a theory of mental health should be.Christopher Boorse - 1976 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 6 (1):61–84.

View all 17 references / Add more references