Resisting aliefs: Gendler on belief-discordant behaviors

Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):77 - 91 (2011)
Abstract
This paper challenges T. S. Gendler's notion of aliefs, a novel kind of mental state which she introduces to explain a wide variety of belief-discordant behaviors. In particular, I argue that many of the cases which she uses to motivate such a mental state can be fully explained by accounts that make use only of commonplace attitudes such as beliefs and desires
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References found in this work BETA
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
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Similar books and articles
Eric Mandelbaum (2013). Against Alief. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):197-211.
Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Andrew Huddleston (2012). Naughty Beliefs. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):209-222.
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