The evidence of your own eyes

Minds and Machines 3 (2):201-218 (1993)
Abstract
The evidence of your own eyes has often been regarded as unproblematic. But we know that people make mistaken observations. This can be looked on as unimportant if there issome class of statements that can serve as evidence for others, or if every statement in our corpus of knowledge is allowed to be no more than probable. Neither of these alternatives is plausible when it comes to machine or robotic observation. Then we must take the possibility of error seriously, and we must be prepared to deal with error quantitatively. The problem of using internal evidence to arrive at error distributions is the main focus of the paper.
Keywords Observation  error  probability  observation statement  observation report  observational judgment  perception  input
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,731
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Henry E. Kyburg Jr (1983). The Reference Class. Philosophy of Science 50 (3):374-397.
Isaac Levi (1969). If Jones Only Knew More! British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 20 (2):153-159.
Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

18 ( #91,347 of 1,098,650 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #22,067 of 1,098,650 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.