David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 165 (1):1-27 (2013)
The Gettier problem has stymied epistemologists. But, whether or not this problem is resolvable, we still must face an important question: Why does the Gettier problem arise in the first place? So far, philosophers have seen it as either a problem peculiar to the concept of knowledge, or else an instance of a general problem about conceptual analysis. But I would like to steer a middle course. I argue that the Gettier problem arises because knowledge is a thick concept, and a Gettier-like problem is just what we should expect from attempts at analyzing a thick concept. Section 2 is devoted to establishing the controversial claim that knowledge is thick, and, in Sect. 3, I show that there is a general problem for analyzing thick concepts of which the Gettier problem is a special instance. I do not take a stand on whether the Gettier problem, or its general counterpart, is resolvable. My primary aim is to bring these problems into better focus
|Keywords||Knowledge Thick concepts Thick terms Gettier problem Analysis Epistemic luck Veritic luck|
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2007). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Blackwell Pub..
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Duncan Pritchard (2005). Epistemic Luck. Clarendon Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
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