Habits-Expressivism About Epistemic Justification

Philosophical Papers 41 (2):209 - 237 (2012)
Abstract Although expressivist theories have been applied to many normative discourses (moral, rationality, knowledge, etc.), the normative discourse of epistemic justification has been somewhat neglected by expressivists. In this paper, I aspire to both remedy this unfortunate situation and introduce a novel version of expressivist theory: Habits-Expressivism. To pave the way for habits-expressivism, I turn to Allan Gibbard's (1990, 2003, 2008) seminal work on expressivism. I first examine Gibbard's (2003, 2008) late plan-reliance expressivism and argue that it faces certain problems when applied to epistemic justification discourse. As a response to these problems, I go on to introduce habits-expressivism and argue that not only does it avoid the identified problems for plan-reliance-expressivism, but it also captures the basic attractions of both plan-reliance expressivism and Gibbard's (1990) early theory of norm-expressivism
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