David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):265-283 (2008)
Many or almost all writers about truth seem to agree that the entailment by a more or less formal account of truth of all the instances of the so-called disquotational schema - (DQ) <p> is true if and only if p - is at least a necessary condition for this account to count as an adequate account of truth. My first task in this paper is to show that the correctness of the observation (DQ) does not by itself imply that truth lacks substance. My second task is to establish the instances of (DQ) as not only necessary but also sufficient for a characterisation of truth. Such a minimal theory of truth would seem to rob truth of all substance but going in for a more eloquent alternative as I shall attempt to show could result in an unwanted epistemisation of truth.
|Keywords||deflationism truth-biology truth|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Paul Horwich (2010). Truth-Meaning-Reality. Oxford University Press.
Kyle Swan (2002). Emotivism and Deflationary Truth. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):270–281.
Marian David (1994). Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth. Oxford University Press.
Panu Raatikainen (2005). On Horwich's Way Out. Analysis 65 (287):175-177.
Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons (2006). Deflationism. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oup Oxford.
Jeffrey Hershfield (2012). Missed It By That Much: Austin on Norms of Truth. Philosophia 40 (2):357-363.
Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
Cezary Cieśliński (2010). Truth, Conservativeness, and Provability. Mind 119 (474):409-422.
Douglas Patterson (2002). Theories of Truth and Convention T. Philosophers' Imprint 2 (5):1-16.
Added to index2009-11-23
Total downloads9 ( #128,952 of 1,089,100 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,982 of 1,089,100 )
How can I increase my downloads?