Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (2):201-221 (2009)
|Abstract||John Rawls's claim to have demonstrated the superiority of his own two principles of justice to the principle of utility has generated fairly extensive critical discussion. However, this discussion has almost completely disregarded those of Rawls's arguments that are concerned with practicability, despite the significance accorded to them by Rawls himself. This article addresses the three most important of Rawls's objections against the practicability of utilitarianism: (1) that utilitarianism would generate too much disagreement to be politically workable, (2) that a utilitarian society would be vulnerable to social instability, and (3) that publicly adopting the principle of utility as the ultimate criterion of right and wrong would undermine the self-respect of some citizens. It is argued that Rawls's objections are either exaggerated or mistaken, and that this may have an impact on the assessment of `justice as fairness' as well as the utilitarian doctrine. Key Words: justice as fairness • feasibility • disagreement • stability • self-respect.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Holly Smith Goldman (1980). Rawls and Utilitarianism. In Gene Blocker & Elizabeth Smith (eds.), John Rawls' Theory of Social Justice. Ohio University Press.
Roberto Alejandro (1998). The Limits of Rawlsian Justice. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Marc Fleurbaey, Maurice Salles & John A. Weymark (eds.) (2008). Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism: Themes From Harsanyi and Rawls. Cambridge University Press.
Fabienne Peter (2009). Rawlsian Justice. In Paul Anand, Prastanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice.
Remi Odedoyin (2000). Overlapping Consensus. Journal of Philosophical Research 25:323-343.
Nir Eyal (2005). ‘Perhaps the Most Important Primary Good’: Self-Respect and Rawls’s Principles of Justice. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (2):195-219.
Thomas L. Carson (1983). Strict Compliance and Rawls's Critique of Utilitarianism. Theoria 49 (3):142-158.
Added to index2009-04-04
Total downloads64 ( #17,333 of 722,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?