|Abstract||A common view in the recent philosophical literature is that knowledge is the norm governing proper assertion. Thus, according to Keith DeRose, “…one is positioned well-enough to assert that P iff one knows that P” (DeRose 2002, p. 180). Let us call the thesis expressed here the Knowledge Norm of Assertion, or the KNA, and formulate it as follows.|
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