Envy and resentment

Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):31 – 45 (2001)
Abstract
Envy and resentment are generally thought to be unpleasant and unethical emotions which ought to be condemned. I argue that both envy and resentment, in some important forms, are moral emotions connected with concern for justice, understood in terms of desert and entitlement. They enable us to recognise injustice, work as a spur to acting against it and connect us to others. Thus, we should accept these emotions as part of the ethical life.
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    References found in this work BETA
    Aaron Ben-Ze'ev (1997). Emotions and Morality. Journal of Value Inquiry 31 (2):195-212.
    Nico H. Frijda (1986). The Emotions. Cambridge University Press.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Alice MacLachlan (2010). Unreasonable Resentments. Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (4):422-441.
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