Group Knowledge Attributions

Abstract

A view growing in popularity in the current philosophical literature is that the purpose of knowledge attributions is to identify or flag good informants. Such a thesis has its origin in the work of Bernard Williams and Edward Craig. Williams, for instance, claims that the central point of the concept of knowledge is “to find somebody who is a source of reliable information about something” (1973, p

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Citations of this work

What's the point of knowing how?Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):693-708.
Group virtue epistemology.Jesper Kallestrup - 2016 - Synthese 197 (12):5233-5251.
Group Knowledge and Epistemic Defeat.J. Adam Carter - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.
Epistemic contextualism defended.Robin McKenna - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):363-383.

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