Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2):294-295 (2004)
|Abstract||The computational hypothesis was formulated with due concern for limits and is consistent with imposed intelligibility doctrines. Theories are products of scientific work that impose human classifications and formalisms on nature. The claim that “cognitive agents are dynamical systems” is untenable. Dynamical formalisms imposed on a natural system, given an approximate fit, serve as an explanatory framework and render a represented system predictable and intelligible.|
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