Knowledge and credit

Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42 (2009)
Abstract
A widely accepted view in recent work in epistemology is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement that is properly creditable to those subjects who possess it. More precisely, according to the Credit View of Knowledge, if S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. In spite of its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, I have elsewhere argued that the Credit View is false. Various responses have been offered to my argument and I here consider each of these objections in turn. I show that none succeeds in undermining my argument and, thus, my original conclusion stands—the Credit View of Knowledge is false
Keywords Knowledge  Credit  Credit View of Knowledge  Testimony  Gettier cases
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DOI 10.2307/27734349
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References found in this work BETA
John Greco (2003). ``Knowledge as Credit for True Belief". In Michael DePaul & Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press 111-134.

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Citations of this work BETA
Baron Reed (2009). A New Argument for Skepticism. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104.

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