Moral phenomenology and a moral ontology of the human person

Abstract
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons’ work implies four criteria that moral phenomenology must be capable of meeting if it is to be a viable field of study that can make a worthwhile contribution to moral philosophy. It must be (a) about a unifed subject matter as well as being, (b) wide, (c) independent, and (d) robust. Contrary to some scepticism about the possibility or usefulness of this field, I suggest that these criteria can be met by elucidating the very foundations of moral experience or what I call a moral ontology of the human person. I attempt to partially outline such an ontology by engaging with Robert Sokolowski's phenomenology of the human person from a moral perspective. My analysis of Sokolowski's thought leads me to five core ideas of a moral ontology of the human person: well-being, virtue, freedom, responsibility, and phronesis. Though I do not by any means boast a complete moral ontology of the human person, I go on to demonstrate how the account I have presented, or something like it, can go a long way to helping moral phenomenology meet the criteria it requires to be a viable and worthwhile pursuit
Keywords Aristotle  Categoriality  Moral Ontology  Moral Phenomenology  Phronesis  Robert Sokolowski  Syntax
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,802
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Julia Annas (2008). The Phenomenology of Virtue. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):21-34.
John Drummond (2008). Moral Phenomenology and Moral Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):35-49.
Michael Gill (2008). Variability and Moral Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):99-113.
Michael B. Gill (2009). Moral Phenomenology in Hutcheson and Hume. Journal of the History of Philosophy 47 (4):pp. 569-594.

View all 18 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Uriah Kriegel (2008). Moral Phenomenology: Foundational Issues. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):1-19.
Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2008). Prolegomena to a Future Phenomenology of Morals. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):115-131.
Michael Gill (2008). Variability and Moral Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):99-113.
Philip Nickel (2001). Moral Testimony and its Authority. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):253-266.
Maike Albertzart (2013). Principle-Based Moral Judgement. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008). Is Moral Phenomenology Unified? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):85-97.
Barbara de Mori (2001). Human Rights and Concept of Person. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):159-169.
John Drummond (2008). Moral Phenomenology and Moral Intentionality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):35-49.
Jim Vernon (2008). The Moral Necessity of Moral Conflict in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 13 (1):67-80.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-12-14

Total downloads

39 ( #46,447 of 1,099,731 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

8 ( #33,157 of 1,099,731 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.