David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 158 (3):345--361 (2007)
A view of knowledge—what I call the Deserving Credit View of Knowledge(DCVK)—found in much of the recent epistemological literature, particularly among so-called virtue epistemologists, centres around the thesis that knowledge is something for which a subject deserves credit. Indeed, this is said to be the central difference between those true beliefs that qualify as knowledge and those that are true merely by luck—the former, unlike the latter, are achievements of the subject and are thereby creditable to her. Moreover, it is often further noted that deserving credit is what explains the additional value that knowledge has over merely lucky true belief. In this paper, I argue that the general conception of knowledge found in the DCVK is fundamentally incorrect. In particular, I show that deserving credit cannot be what distinguishes knowledge from merely lucky true belief since knowledge is not something for which a subject always deserves credit.
|Keywords||Knowledge Luck Credit|
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References found in this work BETA
J. Adler (2002). Belief's Own Ethics. MIT Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
J. Adam Carter (2013). A Problem for Pritchard's Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology. Erkenntnis 78 (2):253-275.
J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin (2013). Knowledge and the Value of Cognitive Ability. Synthese 190 (17):3715-3729.
Stephen R. Grimm (2012). “The Value of Understanding”. Philosophy Compass 7 (2):103-117.
Christoph Kelp (2011). In Defence of Virtue Epistemology. Synthese 179 (3):409-33.
Duncan Pritchard (2010). Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis. Synthese 175 (1):133 - 151.
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