Identity and discernibility in philosophy and logic

Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):162-186 (2012)
Questions about the relation between identity and discernibility are important both in philosophy and in model theory. We show how a philosophical question about identity and dis- cernibility can be ‘factorized’ into a philosophical question about the adequacy of a formal language to the description of the world, and a mathematical question about discernibility in this language. We provide formal definitions of various notions of discernibility and offer a complete classification of their logical relations. Some new and surprising facts are proved; for instance, that weak dis- cernibility corresponds to discernibility in a language with constants for every object, and that weak discernibility is the most discerning nontrivial discernibility relation.
Keywords structuralism   discernibility   identity
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DOI 10.1017/S1755020311000281
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References found in this work BETA
F. A. Muller & Simon Saunders (2008). Discerning Fermions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):499-548.

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Tomasz Bigaj (2015). Dissecting Weak Discernibility of Quanta. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 50:43-53.

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