The calibration question

Abstract
Recent discussion of the calibration of probability assessments is related to the earlier influential attitudes of Fréchet. The limiting frequency criterion of good calibration is criticised as being of no relevance to the evaluation of the probability of any event. An operational definition of good calibration is proposed which treats calibration properties as characteristics of the assessor's entire body of opinion, not of opinion about some particular event or events. In these terms a result is shown which says that every coherent opinion distribution is well-calibrated. Scoring rule representations as calibration plus refinement scores are discussed. It is proposed that a subjectivist could well attribute particular bad experiences to 'luck', and must balance this sense of luck with a sense of the inadequacy of his/her own knowledge when evaluating previous knowledge and experience
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