Philosophy of Science 77 (1):117-136 (2010)
|Abstract||It is argued that recent discussion of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII) and quantum mechanics has lost sight of the broader philosophical motivation and significance of PII and that the `received view' of the status of PII in the light of quantum mechanics survives recent criticisms of it by Muller, Saunders, and Seevinck.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
James Ladyman, Øystein Linnebo & Richard Pettigrew (2012). Identity and Discernibility in Philosophy and Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):162-186.
R. L. Barnette (1978). Does Quantum Mechanics Disprove the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles? Philosophy of Science 45 (3):466-470.
Charles B. Cross (2011). Brute Facts, the Necessity of Identity, and the Identity of Indiscernibles. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (1):1-10.
Robert C. Hilborn & Candice L. Yuca (2002). Identical Particles in Quantum Mechanics Revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):355-389.
Peter Ainsworth (2011). Ontic Structural Realism and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Erkenntnis 75 (1):67-84.
Steven French (1989). Why the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is Not Contingently True Either. Synthese 78 (2):141 - 166.
F. A. Muller & M. P. Seevinck (2009). Discerning Elementary Particles. Philosophy of Science 76 (2):179-200.
Added to index2010-02-27
Total downloads244 ( #784 of 549,198 )
Recent downloads (6 months)31 ( #1,442 of 549,198 )
How can I increase my downloads?