David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 178 (1):87 - 98 (2011)
van Fraassen (The empirical stance, 2002) contrasts the empirical stance with the materialist stance. The way he describes them makes both of them attractive, and while opposed they have something in common for both stances are scientific approaches to philosophy. The difference between them reflects their differing conceptions of science itself. Empiricists emphasise fallibilism, verifiability and falsifiability, and also to some extent scepticism and tolerance of novel hypotheses. Materialists regard the theoretical picture of the world as matter in motion as a true and explanatory account and insist on not taking ' spooky' entities or processes seriously as potential explanations of phenomena that so far lie outside the scope of successful science. The history of science shows us that both stances have been instrumental in the achievement of progress at various times. It is therefore plausible for a naturalist to suggest that science depends for its success on the dialectic between empiricism and materialism. A truly naturalist approach to philosophy ought then to synthesise them. Call the synthesized empiricist and materialist stances 4he scientistic stance'.This paper elaborates and defends it
|Keywords||Stance Empirical stance Materialist stance Scientistic stance Empiricism Materialism Scientism van Fraassen|
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References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
James Ladyman (2007). Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. Oxford University Press.
E. J. Lowe (2005). The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. Oxford University Press.
Theodore Sider (2007). Parthood. Philosophical Review 116 (1):51-91.
Carl Hempel (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. The Free Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Sandy C. Boucher (2015). Functionalism and Structuralism as Philosophical Stances: Van Fraassen Meets the Philosophy of Biology. Biology and Philosophy 30 (3):383-403.
Fabio Boschetti (forthcoming). Models and People: An Alternative View of the Emergent Properties of Computational Models. Complexity:n/a-n/a.
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