David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Logos 21:193-211 (2012)
This paper discusses there is no sustainable theoretical alternative for building knowledge without principles including cooperation –aimed at the preparation and distribution of beliefs– among individuals. This principle helps to conceive both the relation among internalist and externalist theories, and a cognitive explanation based on the concept of epistemic warrant. The concluding remark is that concepts, like evidence or reliability, can only be conceived as skills of subjects belonging to a community.
|Keywords||Epistemic cooperation Reliability Contextualism Warrant|
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