Seguridad epistémica, convicción y escepticismo

Daimon 56:139-154 (2012)
Abstract This paper presents the theory of epistemic safety in relation to three problems: similarity, closure, and generality. Within the neo-Moorean framework of skepticism, the epistemic safety theory complements contextualist theories, where a difference is established between sceptical-thought and everyday contexts. In this way, it is claimed that conviction–i.e., when the bases upon which a belief is constructed remain unquestioned–is an intellectual virtue that makes trustworthy processes in near worlds possible. Finally, the aim of the paper is to highlight the modal difference between beliefs that presuppose near worlds as their core and those that take nearby words as their core.
Keywords epistemic safety  possible worlds  contextualism  skepticism
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