David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):5-18 (2002)
A conscious being is characterized by its ability to cope with the environment--to perceive it, sometimes change it, and perhaps reflect on it. Surprisingly, most studies of the mind's place in nature show little interest in such interaction. It is often implicitly assumed that the main questions about consciousness just concern the status of various entities, levels, etc., within the individual. The intertwined notions of " experience" and " consciousness" are considered. The predominant use of these notions in cognitive science can be traced back to Cartesianism. What is important is the survival of the central methodological commitments despite seemingly profound changes of metaphysical outlook. The author argues that cognitive scientists typically assimilate perception to sensation, thereby ignoring ways in which descriptions of perception and descriptions of the environment are logically intertwined; that this involves methodological solipsism and an unacknowledged sceptical position that was originally part of Descartes' Dream argument; and that it is impossible to identify the object supposedly to be studied by a science of the phenomenal consciousness. A somewhat parallel argument is identified in Kant's critique of rationalist psychology
|Keywords||Consciousness Experience Metaphysics Psychology Descartes|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Jerry A. Fodor (1981). Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
John R. Searle (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Citations of this work BETA
Olli Lagerspetz (2002). In the Industry. Inquiry 45 (4):541-559.
Similar books and articles
Stephen Priest (1981). Descartes, Kant, and Self-Consciousness. Philosophical Quarterly 31 (125):348-351.
Michel Ferrari & Adrien Pinard (2006). Death and Resurrection of a Disciplined Science of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (12):75-96.
Alastair Hannay (1990). Human Consciousness. Routledge.
Mark Rowlands (2003). Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
Alison Simmons (2012). Cartesian Consciousness Reconsidered. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (2).
Barry F. Dainton (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge.
Pirooz Fatoorchi (2008). Avicenna on the Human Self‐Consciousness. In Mehmet Mazak & Nevzat Ozkaya (eds.), International Ibn Sina Symposium Papers (vol.2). FSF Printing House
Mark Rowlands (2001). The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
Christian Barth (2011). Bewusstsein bei Descartes. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2):162-194.
Eric Dietrich & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2002). A Connecticut Yalie in King Descartes' Court. Newsletter of Cognitive Science Society (Now Defunct).
Steve Naragon (1990). Kant on Descartes and the Brutes. Kant-Studien 81 (1):1-23.
Michael Tye (1995). The Burning House. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic & Paderborn 81--90.
Daisie Radner (1988). Thought and Consciousness in Descartes. Journal of the History of Philosophy 26 (3):439-452.
Mark Rowlands (2002). Two Dogmas of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (5-6):158-80.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads56 ( #74,077 of 1,792,924 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #463,828 of 1,792,924 )
How can I increase my downloads?