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Probability judgment in hierarchical learning: a conflict between predictiveness and coherence
Cognition 83 (1):81-112 (2002)
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The propositional nature of human associative learning.Chris J. Mitchell, Jan De Houwer & Peter F. Lovibond - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):183-198.
On the determinants of the conjunction fallacy: Probability versus inductive confirmation.Katya Tentori, Vincenzo Crupi & Selena Russo - 2013 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 142 (1):235.
Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.
Generics and typicality: a bounded rationality approach.Robert van Rooij & Katrin Schulz - 2020 - Linguistics and Philosophy 43 (1):83-117.
Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Crupi Vincenzo, Fitelson Branden & Tentori Katya - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182-199.
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