David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Social Epistemology 21 (3):281 – 297 (2007)
At the intersection of social and virtue epistemology lies the important, yet so far entirely neglected, project of articulating the social dimensions of epistemic virtues. Perhaps the most obvious way in which epistemic virtues might be social is that they may be possessed by social collectives. We often speak of groups as if they could instantiate epistemic virtues. It is tempting to think of these expressions as ascribing virtues not to the groups themselves, but to their members. Adapting Margaret Gilbert's arguments against individualist accounts of collective beliefs, I show that individualist accounts of group virtues are either too weak or too strong. I then formulate a non-individualist account modeled after Gilbert's influential account of collective beliefs. A crucial disanalogy between collective traits and beliefs, I argue, makes the success of this model unlikely. I conclude with some questions with which the future work on collective epistemic virtues should engage.
|Keywords||belief, collective knowledge, epistemology, gilbert margaret, group, individualism, social epistemology, virtue|
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References found in this work BETA
John M. Doris (2002). Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior. Cambridge University Press.
Linda Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Guy Axtell & J. Adam Carter (2008). Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology. Philosophical Papers 37 (3):413-434.
Jason Baehr (2008). Four Varieties of Character-Based Virtue Epistemology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):469-502.
Sean Cordell (forthcoming). Group Virtues: No Great Leap Forward with Collectivism. Res Publica:1-17.
Todd Jones (2007). Numerous Ways to Be an Open-Minded Organization: A Reply to Lahroodi. Social Epistemology 21 (4):439 – 448.
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