Abstract

Within the rational choice approach trust is usually analysed as a problem of choice under uncertainty. In a standard social situation in which trust plays a role a trustor A has to choose between trusting or mistrusting a trustee B. If he chooses to trust, B can either honour the trust given which will be of some advantage to both or exploit it no matter what the consequences for A are. A can in general protect himself against being exploited by choosing not to trust. But then he forgoes the possible advantages of trustful co-operation. A´s problem typically is that he is not sufficiently informed about B´s incentives or motivation. He may, for instance, not know whether B possesses some favourable character traits or not. The paper uses the well known game of trust with imperfect information to illustrate the core of the problem. From a rational choice point of view the possibility of a trustful decision is determined by the beliefs of A concerning B´s preferences. Thus the crucial parameter in the model is a probability measure p that measures A´s subjective expectations that a rational B will co-operate. According to the standard rational choice account trust is either a consequence or simply the expression of the expectations of a trustee represented by p. I refer to this account of trust as the theory of trust as rational expectancy. I shall criticise this solely cognitive view of trust for neglecting some central aspects of trusting relationships. My argument draws on the distinction between trust and reliance. It will be based on some simple observations, in particular: 1. The perception of the choice problem by the trustor as well as his perception of the trustee and the trustee´s characteristics may depend on wether or not the trustor is in fact trusting or mistrusting. 2. The trustor´s evaluation of the possible outcomes may depend on wether or not the trustor is in fact trusting or mistrusting. 3. The motivation of the trustee will often depend on whether he is trusted or not. If my argument is sound, then - to some considerable extend - it is impossible to analyse trust problems solely in terms of options, preferences and believes. There simply are no preferences and believes of the interacting individuals which are prior to and independent of trust. Trust then must be understood as a cause or basis of a trustor´s expectations, and not as their consequence. I shall finish my considerations by pointing to some general implications for an account of trust as social capital.