David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Biology and Philosophy 18 (5):639-651 (2003)
I offer a critical analysis of a view that has become a dominant aspect of recent thought on the relationship between evolution and morality, and propose an alternative. An ingredient in Michael Ruse's 'error theory' (Ruse 1995) is that belief in moral (prescriptive, universal, and nonsubjective) guidelines arose in humans because such belief results in the performance of adaptive cooperative behaviors. This statement relies on two particular connections: between ostensible and intentional types of altruism, and between intentional altruism and morality. The latter connection is problematic because it makes morality redundant, its role having already been fulfilled by the psychological dispositions that constitute intentional altruism. Both behavioral ecology and moral psychology support this criticism, and neither human behavioral flexibility nor the self-regard / other-regard distinction can provide a defense of the error theory. I conclude that morality did not evolve to curb rampant selfishness; instead, the evolutionarily recent 'universal law' aspect of morality may function to update behavioral strategies which were adaptive in the paleolithic environment of our ancestors (to which our psychological dispositions are best adapted), by means of norms more appropriate to our novel social environment.
|Keywords||Adaptation, Altruism Behavioral ecology Cultural evolution Error theory Evolutionary ethics Evolutionary psychology Morality Updating mechanism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jon Tresan (2010). Question Authority: In Defense of Moral Naturalism Without Clout. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):221 - 238.
Scott James (2009). The Caveman's Conscience: Evolution and Moral Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):215-233.
Christine Clavien (2009). Comment Comprendre les Émotions Morales. Dialogue 48 (03):601-.
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