David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 60 (1):67-85 (1993)
I argue that, contrary to some critics, the notion of conscious experience is a good candidate for denoting a distinct and scientifically interesting phenomenon in the brain. I base this claim mainly on an analysis of neuropsychological data concerning deficits resulting from various types of brain damage as well as some additional supporting empirical evidence. These data strongly point to the hypothesis that conscious experience expresses information that is available for global, integrated, and flexible behavior
|Keywords||Behavior Brain Consciousness Neurophysiology Science|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Anthony P. Atkinson & Martin Davies (1995). Consciousness Without Conflation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):248-249.
Jeffrey A. Gray (1995). Consciousness and its (Dis)Contents. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):703-722.
N. F. Dixon (1995). Breakthrough on the Consciousness Front or Much Ado About Nothing? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):253.
Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma (1995). Feeling of Knowing and Phenomenal Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271.
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