A Critique of Charles Taylor's Notions of “Moral Sources” and “Constitutive Goods”

In this paper I argue that moral realism does not, pace Charles Taylor, need “moral sources” or “constitutive goods”, and adding these concepts distorts the basic insights of what can be called “cultural” moral realism.1 Yet the ideas of “moral topography” or “moral space” as well as the idea of “ontological background pictures” are valid, if separated from those notions. What does Taylor mean by these notions?
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James B. Sauer (1997). Language, Meaning, and Ethics. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 4 (1/2):48-55.
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