Interpersonal recognition: A response to value or a precondition of personhood?

Inquiry 45 (4):463 – 478 (2002)
This article suggests first that the concept of interpersonal recognition be understood in a multidimensional (as opposed to one-dimensional), practical (as opposed to symbolic), and strict (as opposed to broad) way. Second, it is argued that due recognition be seen as a reason-governed response to evaluative features, rather than all normativity and reasons being seen as generated by recognition. This can be called a response-model, or, more precisely, a value-based model of due recognition. A further suggestion is that there is a systematic basis for distinguishing three dimensions of recognition, depending on whether recognition is given to someone qua a person, qua a certain kind of person, or qua a certain person. Finally, it is argued that recognition is a necessary condition of personhood, but whether it is of direct or indirect relevance depends on our theories of personhood (social vs. capacity-theory) and practical identity (dialogical definition model vs. feature-model). Despite the apparent opposition, it is shown that interpersonal recognition is both a response to value and a precondition of personhood.
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DOI 10.1080/002017402320947559
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Paul Ricoeur (1995). Oneself as Another. University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Arto Laitinen (2006). Interpersonal Recognition and Responsiveness to Relevant Differences. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9 (1):47-70.
Peter Jones (2006). Equality, Recognition and Difference. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 9 (1):23-46.
Heikki Ikäheimo (2013). Nature in Spirit. Critical Horizons 13 (2):149 - 153.

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