Concepts are a functional kind. Comment on Machery's Doing Without Concepts.

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):217-18 (2010)
Abstract
This commentary focuses on Machery's eliminativist claim, that ought to be eliminated from the theoretical vocabulary of psychology because it fails to denote a natural kind. I argue for the more traditional view that concepts are a functional kind, which provides the simplest account of the empirical evidence discussed by Machery
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,361
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Jaegwon Kim (1992). Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):1-26.

View all 6 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Edouard Machery (2010). Précis of Doing Without Concepts. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.
Edouard Machery (2005). Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind. Philosophy of Science 72 (3):444-467.
Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence, Concepts. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-09-14

Total downloads

3 ( #297,395 of 1,102,700 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #120,386 of 1,102,700 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.