David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The Monist 95 (3):486-510 (2012)
Recent work in moral theory has seen the refinement of theories of moral standing, which increasingly recognize a position of intermediate standing between fully self-conscious entities and those which are merely conscious. Among the most sophisticated concepts now used to denote such intermediate standing is that of primitive self-consciousness, which has been used to more precisely elucidate the moral standing of human newborns. New research into the structure of the avian brain offers a revised view of the cognitive abilities of birds. When this research is approached with a species-specific focus, it appears likely that one familiar species, the chicken (Gallus gallus domesticus), also exhibits primitive self-consciousness. Given the likelihood that they are primitively self-consciousness, chickens warrant a degree of moral standing that falls short of that enjoyed by persons, but which exceeds the minimal standing of merely conscious entities.
|Keywords||Animal cognition Moral standing Primitive self-consciousness Neuroethics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Tom L. Beauchamp (1999). The Failure of Theories of Personhood. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (4):309-324.
Rick O'Neil (1997). Intrinsic Value, Moral Standing, and Species. Environmental Ethics 19 (1):45-52.
Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery (2012). The Two Sources of Moral Standing. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):303-324.
Ann B. Butler, Paul R. Manger, B. I. B. Lindahl & Peter Århem (2005). Evolution of the Neural Basis of Consciousness: A Bird-Mammal Comparison. Bioessays 27 (9):923-936.
Naomi M. Eilan (2000). Primitive Consciousness and the 'Hard Problem'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):28-39.
Axel Cleeremans (2001). Conscious and Unconscious Processes in Cognition. International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences.
Julia Tanner (2013). Contractarianism and Secondary Direct Moral Standing for Marginal Humans and Animals. Res Publica 19 (2):1-16.
A. T. Anchustegui (2005). Biocentric Ethics and Animal Prosperity. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (1):105-119.
Donald R. Griffin (2001). Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness. University of Chicago Press.
Bernd Heinrich (2002). Raven Consciousness. In Marc Bekoff, Colin Allen & Gordon M. Burghardt (eds.), The Cognitive Animal: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives on Animal Cognition. MIT Press 47-52.
Andrew I. Cohen (2008). Dependent Relationships and the Moral Standing of Nonhuman Animals. Ethics and the Environment 13 (2):pp. 1-21.
Gregory R. Peterson (2003). Being Conscious of Marc Bekoff: Thinking of Animal Self-Consciousness. Zygon 38 (2):247-256.
Adam Kolber (2002). Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and Other Apes. Stanford Law Review 54:163-204.
Added to index2012-07-01
Total downloads56 ( #78,200 of 1,911,320 )
Recent downloads (6 months)16 ( #37,841 of 1,911,320 )
How can I increase my downloads?