Assertion and Affirmation in the Early Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein-Studien 2 (1):21-47 (2011)
The Tractatus rejects the sign of assertion as "logically meaningless", but the rejection of the sign did not lead Wittgenstein to reject the corresponding notion. I show the presence and the importance in the early Wittgenstein of a notion keenly similar to Fregean and Russellian logical assertion. I propose to call this notion "affirmation." The preparatory writings and the TLP present different theories about affirmation. The correct understanding of the nature and purpose of affirmation proves critical in order to confront another issue about the Tractatus: the only partial similarity between the theory of pictures and the theory of propositions.
Keywords Assertion  Wittgenstein  Tractatus  Judgment  Carroll's Paradox
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