An Answer of Behalf of Guanilo

Philosophy and Theology 7 (1):81-96 (1992)
Abstract
The ontological proof is wrong because it can be used to prove not only the existence of God, but also of imaginary entities such as spirits of stones and trees. etc. It is faulty because it proves too much; it can be used to prove not only the existence of God, but also the existence of a vast number of imaginary entities to the existence of which theists would not like to commit themselves
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 11,456
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
David Twetten (2006). On Which 'God' Should Be the Target of a 'Proof of God's Existence'. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 8:75-80.
Yiftach J. H. Fehige (2009). Thought Experimenting with God. Revisiting the Ontological Argument. Neue Zeitschrift Für Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 51 (3):249-267.
William L. Rowe (2009). Alvin Plantinga on the Ontological Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 65 (2):87 - 92.
Elijah Millgram (2004). The Ontological Meta-Argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (3):331-334.
Guy Kahane (2011). Should We Want God to Exist? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):674-696.
Martin Lin (2007). Spinoza's Arguments for the Existence of God. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):269-297.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2011-01-09

Total downloads

2 ( #356,331 of 1,102,446 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #298,159 of 1,102,446 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.