Online research in philosophy

It is shown that a hypothesis about gravity having a virtual cause implies there are two primary reference frames, a reality and a functional virtual reality and an equivalence principle relating the two is postulated. A mathematical expression relating the primary reference frames to the state of reality provides an explanation of particle-wave duality and resolves the controversy about the speed of gravity. A model for motion, time and particle formation is briefly discussed, in which the hypothesis about the virtual cause of gravity and supporting postulates are valid. It is further shown that such model provides solutions to unsolved paradoxes and a unification of consistent but contradictory ancient theories of matter and motion. Finally, a reference is made about the basis for devising experiments and testing the predictions of the model.

This chapter examines the similarities and differences between physical, psychological and virtual realities, and challenges some conventional, implicitly dualist assumptions about how these relate to each other. Virtual realities are not easily understood in either dualist or materialist reductive terms, as they exemplify the reflexive nature of perception. The chapter summarises some of the evidence for this “reflexive model”—and examines some of its consequences for the “hard” problem of consciousness. The chapter then goes on to consider how these realities might relate to some grounding reality or thing-itself, and considers some of the personal and social consequences of becoming increasingly immersed in virtual realities. Although this chapter was published in 1998 and develops work published in 1990, it presents a form of “radical externalism” that anticipates many themes in current (2006) internalism versus externalism debates about the nature of mind. It is also relevant to an understanding of virtual reality “presence.”.

We approach the virtual reality phenomenon by studying its relationship to set theory. This approach offers a characterization of virtual reality in set theoretic terms, and we investigate the case where this is done using the wellfoundedness property. Our hypothesis is that non-wellfounded sets (so-called hypersets) give rise to a different quality of virtual reality than do familiar wellfounded sets. To elaborate this hypothesis, we describe virtual reality through Sommerhoff’s categories of first- and second-order self-awareness; introduced as necessary conditions for consciousness in terms of higher cognitive functions. We then propose a representation of first- and second-order self-awareness through sets, and assume that these sets, which we call events, originally form a collection of wellfounded sets. Strong virtual reality characterizes virtual reality environments which have the limited capacity to create only events associated with wellfounded sets. In contrast, the logically weaker and more general concept of weak virtual reality characterizes collections of virtual reality mediated events altogether forming an entirety larger than any collection of wellfounded sets. By giving reference to Aczel’s hyperset theory we indicate that this definition is not empty because hypersets encompass wellfounded sets already. Moreover, we argue that weak virtual reality could be realized in human history through continued progress in computer technology. Finally, within a more general framework, we use Baltag’s structural theory of sets (STS) to show that within this hyperset theory Sommerhoff’s first- and second-order self-awareness as well as both concepts of virtual reality admit a consistent mathematical representation. To illustrate our ideas, several examples and heuristic arguments are discussed.

What comes after the Internet? The world of the virtual, a place where you could be hard pressed to know if the person standing next to you is physically real or virtual or whether they have human or artificial intelligence. The Third Millennium promises to bridge the gap between the natural and artificial in new and powerful ways- namely HyperReality. Here there are new scopes for telemedicine, HyperTranslation (to speak in one language and be heard in another), and virtual reality popping out of books, and media to co-exist with us. This book is edited by two primary actors in the field of HyperReality- Terashima led the team which developed the prototype for HyperReality and its conceptualization, and Tiffin is founder of the first virtual university and a leader on the role of technology in education. HyperReality offers a large window into the future of technology, defining what it is, how it works, and explores the implications of this for everything from medicine to leisure, the elderlyand work. The book boasts a list of contributors from around the world and from multiple disciplines- many who have worked directly on the development and application of this new technology.

This article considers the ethical implications of digital virtual reality (DVR) within the context of the place of virtual reality in general in human life and development. This is elaborated through a comparative analysis of the continuity and discontinuity between virtual reality in other mediated forms and DVR. The important role played by virtual reality in human creativity and adaptation sets the context for considering the ethics of DVR in 4 main areas: epistemological questions, questions of distraction and displacement, the content of DVR, and questions of power.

This essay addresses ethical aspects of the design and use of virtual reality (VR) systems, focusing on the behavioral options made available in such systems and the manner in which reality is represented or simulated in them. An assessment is made of the morality of immoral behavior in virtual reality, and of the virtual modeling of such behavior. Thereafter, the ethical aspects of misrepresentation and biased representation in VR applications are discussed.

In Virtual Worlds, Benjamin Woolley examines the reality of virtual reality.

Debate concerning virtual reality is often drawn in terms of sharply defined dichotomies--for example, between "real" (or "actual") and "virtual," "authentic" and "inauthentic," and "natural" and "artificial." In this paper we offer an alternative approach by suggesting a conception of a virtual world that highlights a continuity and commonality with our sense of everyday reality. We accomplish this in part by an examination of the English picturesque garden as if it were a virtual world partially constructed out of ideas and objects collected during travels to foreign lands on the Grand Tour. Such foreign travel transformed not only the English person's sense of self, but also altered the English landscape. We conclude that in one sense the "real" England is also a "virtual" reality.

What is an avatar -- More than just another pretty face : the avatar effect -- Interview with the virtual cannibal -- Virtual presence -- X-reality, a conclusion.