David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:87 - 95 (1994)
In Bayes or Bust?, John Earman attempts to express in Bayesian terms a sense of "projectibility" in which it is logically impossible for "All emeralds are green" and "All emeralds are grue" simultaneously to be projectible. I argue that Earman overlooks an important sense in which these two hypotheses cannot both be projectible. This sense is important because it allows projectibility to be connected to lawlikeness, as Goodman intended. Whether this connection suggests a way to resolve Goodman's famous riddle remains unsettled, awaiting an account of lawlikeness. I explore one line of thought that might prove illuminating.
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Marc Lange (1996). Laws of Nature, Cosmic Coincidences and Scientific Realism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):614 – 638.
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