Externalism, self-knowledge, and inner observation

There is a continuing debate as to whether externalism about mental content is compatible with certain commonly accepted views about the nature of self-knowledge. Both sides to this debate seem to agree that externalism is _not compatible with the traditional view that self-knowledge is acquired by means of observation. In this paper, I argue that externalism is compatible with this traditional view of self-knowledge, and that, in fact, we have good reason to believe that the self-knowledge at issue is acquired by means of observation
Keywords Epistemology  Externalism  Mental  Observation  Self-knowledge
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DOI 10.1080/713659349
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