David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 62 (3):321 - 351 (2005)
John Taurek famously argued that, in ‘conflict cases’, where we are confronted with a smaller and a larger group of individuals, and can choose which group to save from harm, we should toss a coin, rather than saving the larger group. This is primarily because coin-tossing is fairer: it ensures that each individual, regardless of the group to which he or she belongs, has an equal chance of being saved. This article provides a new response to Taurek’s argument. It proposes that there are two possible types of unfairness that have to be avoided in conflict cases, as far as possible: ‘selection unfairness’, which is the unfairness of not giving individuals an equal chance of being saved; and ‘outcome unfairness’, which is the unfairness of not actually saving them, when others are saved. Since saving the greater number generates less outcome unfa-irness than coin-tossing, it is argued that, in many conflict cases, fairness demands that we save the greater number.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Alan Thomas (2012). Giving Each Person Her Due: Taurek Cases and Non-Comparative Justice. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):661-676.
Similar books and articles
Jeremy Snyder (2010). Multiple Forms of Exploitation in International Research: The Need for Multiple Standards of Fairness. American Journal of Bioethics 10 (6):40-41.
Christian Arnsperger & Philippe De Villé (2004). Can Competition Ever Be Fair? Challenging the Standard Prejudice. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (4):433 - 451.
Iwao Hirose (2004). Aggregation and Numbers. Utilitas 16 (1):62-79.
Michael Otsuka (2000). Scanlon and the Claims of the Many Versus the One. Analysis 60 (3):288–293.
Martin Peterson (2009). The Mixed Solution to the Number Problem. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2):166-177.
Katharina Rasmussen (2012). Should the Probabilities Count? Philosophical Studies 159 (2):205-218.
Rob Lawlor (2006). Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):149 - 166.
Ben Saunders (2009). A Defence of Weighted Lotteries in Life Saving Cases. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):279 - 290.
Re'em Segev (2006). Well-Being and Fairness. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):369-391.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads39 ( #48,847 of 1,168,893 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #60,883 of 1,168,893 )
How can I increase my downloads?