David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Erkenntnis 62 (3):321 - 351 (2005)
John Taurek famously argued that, in ‘conflict cases’, where we are confronted with a smaller and a larger group of individuals, and can choose which group to save from harm, we should toss a coin, rather than saving the larger group. This is primarily because coin-tossing is fairer: it ensures that each individual, regardless of the group to which he or she belongs, has an equal chance of being saved. This article provides a new response to Taurek’s argument. It proposes that there are two possible types of unfairness that have to be avoided in conflict cases, as far as possible: ‘selection unfairness’, which is the unfairness of not giving individuals an equal chance of being saved; and ‘outcome unfairness’, which is the unfairness of not actually saving them, when others are saved. Since saving the greater number generates less outcome unfa-irness than coin-tossing, it is argued that, in many conflict cases, fairness demands that we save the greater number.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
|Through your library||Configure|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Alan Thomas (2012). Giving Each Person Her Due: Taurek Cases and Non-Comparative Justice. [REVIEW] Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):661-676.
Similar books and articles
Jeremy Snyder (2010). Multiple Forms of Exploitation in International Research: The Need for Multiple Standards of Fairness. American Journal of Bioethics 10 (6):40-41.
Christian Arnsperger & Philippe De Villé (2004). Can Competition Ever Be Fair? Challenging the Standard Prejudice. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (4):433 - 451.
Iwao Hirose (2004). Aggregation and Numbers. Utilitas 16 (1):62-79.
Michael Otsuka (2000). Scanlon and the Claims of the Many Versus the One. Analysis 60 (3):288–293.
Martin Peterson (2009). The Mixed Solution to the Number Problem. Journal of Moral Philosophy 6 (2):166-177.
Katharina Rasmussen (2012). Should the Probabilities Count? Philosophical Studies 159 (2):205-218.
Rob Lawlor (2006). Taurek, Numbers and Probabilities. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (2):149 - 166.
Ben Saunders (2009). A Defence of Weighted Lotteries in Life Saving Cases. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):279 - 290.
Re'em Segev (2006). Well-Being and Fairness. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):369-391.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads33 ( #44,430 of 1,089,155 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #69,735 of 1,089,155 )
How can I increase my downloads?