David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401 (2008)
Abstract: How it is that one's own thoughts can seem to be someone else's? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first-person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current cognitive theories. I show how deficits in the subconscious mechanisms regulating inner speech may lead to a 'fractured phenomenology' responsible for schizophrenic patients' reports of inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations. Supporting work on virtual environments is discussed, and lessons concerning the fixity of delusional belief are drawn.
|Keywords||inner speech thought insertion|
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Citations of this work BETA
Agustin Vicente (2014). The Comparator Account on Thought Insertion, Alien Voices and Inner Speech: Some Open Questions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (2):335-353.
Peter Langland-Hassan (2011). A Puzzle About Visualization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):145-173.
Max Seeger (2013). Commentary on Martin & Pacherie. Out of Nowhere: Thought Insertion, Ownership and Context-Integration. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):261-263.
Peter Langland-Hassan (2009). Metacognition Without Introspection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):151-152.
Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney (2013). Thought Insertion: Abnormal Sense of Thought Agency or Thought Endorsement? Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.
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