Free spech and illocution

Legal Theory 4 (1):21-37 (1998)
We defend the view of some feminist writers that the notion of silencing has to be taken seriously in discussions of free speech. We assume that what ought to be meant by ‘speech’, in the context ‘free speech’, is whatever it is that a correct justification of the right to free speech justifies one in protecting. And we argue that what one ought to mean includes illocution, in the sense of J.L. Austin.
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DOI 10.1017/S1352325200000902
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Ishani Maitra & Mary Kate McGowan (2010). On Silencing, Rape, and Responsibility. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):167 – 172.

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