Kant's compatibilism and his two conceptions of truth

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2):164–188 (2000)
In this paper, I explain how Kant's views can be reconciled, and I argue that the relevance of transcendental idealism here is that it shows that determinism is known to be true, not in accordance with the familiar correspondence notion of truth, but only in accordance with a weaker notion of truth, Kant's empirical notion of truth, which is a kind of coherence notion of truth. (edited)
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