David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (1998)
Rae Langton offers a new interpretation and defense of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Kant distinguishes things in themselves from phenomena, and in so doing he makes a metaphysical distinction between intrinsic and relational properties of substances. Langton argues that his claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is not idealism, but epistemic humility: we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. This interpretation vindicates Kant's scientific realism, and shows his primary/secondary quality distinction to be superior even to modern-day competitors. And it answers the famous charge that Kant's tale of things in themselves is one that makes itself untellable.
|Keywords||Ding an sich|
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|Buy the book||$27.41 used (51% off) $45.41 new (18% off) $50.41 direct from Amazon (9% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||B2799.D5.L36 1998|
|ISBN(s)||0198236530 0199243174 9780198236535|
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam (2006). Moderate Structural Realism About Space-Time. Synthese 160 (1):27 - 46.
Lucy Allais (2004). Kant's One World: Interpreting 'Transcendental Idealism'. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):655 – 684.
Ann Whittle (2006). On an Argument for Humility. Philosophical Studies 130 (3):461 - 497.
James Ladyman (2007). Scientific Structuralism: On the Identity and Diversity of Objects in a Structure. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):23–43.
Bill Brewer (2004). Realism and the Nature of Perceptual Experience. Philosophical Issues 14 (1):61-77.
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