Marshall and Parsons on 'intrinsic'

Dan Marshall and Josh Parsons note, correctly. that the property of being either a cube or accompanied by a cube is incorrectly classified as intrinsic under the definition we have given unless it turns out to be disjunctive. Whether it is disjunctive, under the definition we gave, turns on certain judgements of the relative naturalness of properties. They doubt the judgements of relative naturalness that would classify their property as disjunctive. We disagree. They also suggest that the whole idea of judging relative naturalness is a dubious business. We reply that, like them or not, such judgements cannot easily be avoided.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00108.x
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M. Eddon (2011). Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):314-336.
Lucy Allais (2006). Intrinsic Natures: A Critique of Langton on Kant. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):143–169.
Josh Parsons (2007). Is Everything a World? Philosophical Studies 134 (2):165-181.

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