David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophical Research 24:21-36 (1999)
Moore’s proof consists of the inference of both “Two hands exist at this moment” and “At least two external objects exist at this moment” from the premise “Here is one hand and here is another.” The paper claims that the proof succeeds in refuting both idealism (“There are no external objects”) and skepticism (“Nobody knows that there are external objects”). The paper defends Moore’s proof against the following objections: Idealism does not deny that there is an external world so Moore’s proof is beside the point; Moore may be mistaken about the premise; Moore has failed to prove the premise; Moore has failed to show how he knows the premise; the proof leads to an infinite regress; the proof begs the question because the premise assumes what needs to be proved; the premise depends upon a shaky inference; the premise rests upon evidence of the senses and thus begs the question; the proof fails to convince the skeptic
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Peter Baumann (2009). Was Moore a Moorean? On Moore and Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):181-200.
Similar books and articles
J. Adam Carter (2012). Recent Work on Moores Proof. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (2):115-144.
Annalisa Coliva (2008). The Paradox of Moore's Proof of an External World. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):234–243.
Annalisa Coliva (2012). Moore's Proof, Liberals, and Conservatives : Is There a (Wittgensteinian) Third Way? In Crispin Wright & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes From the Philosophy of Crispin Wright. Oxford University Press
Susana Nuccetelli (2009). Sosa's Moore and the New Dogmatists. Metaphilosophy 40 (2):180-186.
Manuel Pérez Otero (2013). Purposes of Reasoning and (a New Vindication of) Moore's Proof of an External World. Synthese 190 (18):4181-4200.
John Greco (2002). How to Reid Moore. Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):544-563.
Ram Neta (2007). Fixing the Transmission: The New Mooreans. In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Clarendon Press
Tim Willenken (2011). Moorean Responses to Skepticism: A Defense. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.
Wai-hung Wong (2006). Moore, the Skeptic, and the Philosophical Context. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):271–287.
Ernest Sosa (1997). Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles. Journal of Philosophy 94 (8):410-430.
Ian Proops (2006). Soames on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Moore and Russell. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 129 (3):627–635.
Annalisa Coliva (2010). Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):101-116.
George Edward Moore (1939). Proof of an External World. Proceedings of the British Academy 25 (5):273--300.
G. E. Moore (1993). Selected Writings. Routledge.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads57 ( #71,170 of 1,789,994 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #75,461 of 1,789,994 )
How can I increase my downloads?